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IVF and ET conjure up a variety of images, from "test tube babies"
to Steven Spielberg's extraterrestrial. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult
to separate science fiction from scientific reality. Nonetheless, the ex-
tracorporeal fertilization of a human egg followed by transfer to a
human uterus and birth of a child, has been repeated in a number of
countries around the world. In vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo
transfer (ET) are now reality.' Most of us applauded this new
technology along with the parents of the resulting children. These in-
fertile couples were able, with the help of IVF, to have their own off-
spring. But we also have some second thoughts. What are the
broader implications of IVF? Do its benefits to individual couples
Copyright © 1983 by George J. Annas and Sherman Elias.
*Edward Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public
Health; Chairman, Science and Family Committee, Section of Family Law, ABA; Member,
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1. See, e.g., A. Hollister, Test-tube Baby Boom: Small Miracles of Love and Science.
LIFE, Nov., 1982, 44-52. In vitro fertilization is the extracorporeal fertilization of an ovum by
sperm. Embryo transfer is the transfer of the fertilized ovum into the uterine cavity. An
"ovum" is the female germ cell, egg cell, or gamete. An "oocyte" is an immature ovum. A
"zygote" results from the union of a male gamete (sperm) and a female gamete (ovum), until
it divides. An "embryo" is the product of conception from the moment of fertilization until
about the end of the eighth week after fertilization. A "conceptus" is the sum derivatives of a
fertilized ovum at any stage of development from fertilization until birth, including the ex-
traembryonic membranes.
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outweigh its potential dangers to society? Should IVF be regulated?
And if so, who should be the regulator and on what principles should
legal rules be founded?
A study by HEW's Ethics Advisory Board, written in 1979, con-
cluded that "development of a uniform or model law to clarify the
legal status of children born as a result of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer was desirable." 2 Official agencies in Great Britain
and Australia have already developed general guidelines for IVF
research,3 and scientist Clifford Grobstein and Congressman Albert
Gore have suggested the establishment of a presidential commission
to review and monitor the development of IVF and make recommen-
dations for appropriate legislation and regulation. 4 In his speech to
the 1982 meeting of the Section of Family Law at the Annual ABA
Meeting in San Francisco, Father Robert Drinan, S.J., called the
new reproductive technologies the greatest challenge facing the Sec-
tion in the next twenty-five years.
Modifications in reproductive methods have long been viewed as
science fiction and have occasioned both fear and amazement. With
1984 less than a year away, we are reminded of Orwell's world in
which AID (artificial insemination by donor) was mandatory, and
sexual pleasure and the family were destroyed to help maintain the
tension necessary in a society dedicated to perpetual warfare., In
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, the family was also destroyed;
but he portrayed a society controlled not by fear, but by gratification
and reinforcement. 6 Abolition of the family was followed by complete
sexual freedom; but reproduction was handled by the state, in state
2. ETHICS ADIVISORY BOARD, DEPT. HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT AND
CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND
EMBRYO TRANSFER, May 4, 1979, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF. Washington. D.C. at
113. Reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 35055 (June 18, 1979) [hereinafter cited as EAB Report]. A
similar recommendation has been made by Noel P. Keane in regard to surrogate mothers. N.
KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER at 305 (1981).
3. Medical Research Council, Research Related to Human Fertilization and Embryology,
284 BRIT. MED. J. 1480 (1982); Levine, In Britain and Australia, New In Vitro Guidelines, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 2 (Feb. 1983); Duncan, BMA Proposes Guidance Over In Vitro
Fertilization, 43 PULSE 1 (Feb. 5, 1983).
4. C. GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE: AN APPRAISAL OF EXTERNAL HUMAN FER-
TILIZATION at 141 (1981); 218 Sci. 1098 (1982) 219 SCIENCE 935 (1983).
5. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
6. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1931); and see A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD
REVISITED at 26 (1958).
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"hatcheries" in which embryos were produced and monitored in an
artificial environment:
[Of] course, they didn't content themselves with merely hatching out embryos:
any cow could do that. "We also predestine and condition. We decant our
babies as socialized human beings, as Alphas or Epsilons, as future sewage
workers or .... " He was going to say "future World controllers," but correct-
ing himself, said "future Directors of Hatcheries," instead.'
In both futuristic scenarios, the critical elements of governmental
success were the separation of sex from reproduction, and the aboli-
tion of the family. We will, of course, write our own future by our
own actions, and IVF may not prove terribly crucial. Isaac Asimov,
for example, doubts IVF will have much of an impact on society and
sees mainly advantages in complete ectogenesis:
While test-tube fertilization may exist as an added option, it would not be sur-
prising if it proved only minimally popular. We might, of course, go all the way
and dispense with the human womb altogether... The developing embryos
would be under close observation at all times. Minor faults might be corrected.
Embryos with serious deficiencies might be discarded. Some women might
prefer the certainty of having healthy babies.'
Whether one is of the "catastrophe school" or a "rose-colored
glasses" optimist, we cannot afford to permit technological changes
in the way families can be created without careful thought. In this
article we (1) provide a historical overview and a current state of the
art regarding IVF and ET technology, (2) review the legal issues
these technologies raise, and (3) consider potential problems that will
arise should we not "content ourselves" with limiting IVF to married
couples who are infertile because of the wife's obstructed fallopian
tubes.
Historical Aspects
The first reports of mammalian IVF appeared in the scientific litera-
ture over a century ago, and the first successful ETs in rabbits were
reported in 1890. 9 Freshly ejaculated sperm were rarely capable of
fertilizing mature ova either in vivo or in vitro. In the early 1950s it
was discovered that mammalian spermatozoa undergo a change dur-
7. Id. at 8. Cf. E. ZAMIATIN WE (1924) at 22: Lex Sexualis, "A Number may obtain a
license to use any other Number as a sexual product."
8. 1. AsIMoV, A CHOICE OF CATASTROPHES at 352 (1979).
9. Shenk, Das Saugethierei kunstlich befruchet Arisserhalb des Mutterthieres. MITTH.
EMBRYOL. INST. K.K. UNIV. WEIN. 107 (1878); Heape, Preliminary Note on the Transplanta-
tion and Growth of Mammalian Ova within a Uterine Foster Mother. 48 PROC. ROYAL SOC.
457 (1890).
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ing their passage through the epididymides which affects their
maturation and enables them to fertilize ova.' 0 This sperm matura-
tion process, called "capacitation," results from complex (and not
well-understood) physiological, biochemical, and morphological
alterations in the sperm as they proceed through the tubules.
By the late 1960s, experimentation with rabbits resulted in consis-
tent IVF successes. Sperm were recovered from the uterus of a mated
animal after capacitation." The rabbit ova were fertilized in vitro
and allowed to progress to the four-cell stage. Subsequent transfer to
rabbit oviducts resulted in an 80 percent pregnancy rate, and 20 per-
cent live births.I2
Most of the early technical advances in humans were made in
England by Edwards and Steptoe, including fertilization of oocytes
(ova removed directly from the ovary) matured in vitro, in vitro
development of embryos to the blastocyst stage, and collection of
oocytes by laparoscopy. 13 In 1976 they reported a tubal ectopic preg-
nancy resulting from IVF, " and in 1978 they announced the birth of
the world's first IVF baby. Is Shortly thereafter other groups around
the world began achieving successes,16 and in December 1981, the
first IVF birth in the United States was announced at Eastern Vir-
ginia Medical School in Norfolk.
17
10. Austin, Observations on the Penetration of the Sperm into the Mammalian Egg, 84
AusT J. SC. SER. 581 (1951); Chang, Fertilizing Capacity of Sperm Deposited in the Fallo-
pian Tube. 168 NATURE 697 (1951).
11. Thibault, Dauzier & Winter, Etude cytologique de la fecondation in Vitro de L "oeuf
de la labine, 148 C.R. Soc. BIOL. 789 (1959); Chang, Fertilization of Rabbit Ova in Vitro,
184 NATURE 466 (1959).
12. Mills, Jeitles & Brackett, Embryo Transfer Following In Vitro and In Vivo Fertiliza-
tion of Rabbit Ova, 24 FERTIL. STERIL. 602 (1973).
13. Edwards, Bavister & Steptoe, Early Stages of Fertilization In Vitro of Human Oocytes
Matured In Vitro, 221 NATURE 632 (1969); Steptoc & Edwards, Laparoscopic Recovery of
Preovulatory Human Oocytes after Priming of Ovaries with Gonadoptrophins. LANCET 683
(1970); Steptoe, Edwards & Purdy, Human Blastocysts Grown in Culture, 229 NATURE 132
(1971).
14. Steptoe & Edwards, Reimplantation of a Human Embryo with Subsequent Tubal
Pregnancy, LANCET 880 (1976).
15. Steptoe & Edwards, Birth after the Reimplantation of a Human Embryo. LANCET 366
(1978).
16. Lopata, Johnston, Hoult & Speirs, Pregnancy Following Intrauterine Implantation of
an Embryo Obtained by In Vitro Fertilization of a Preovulatory Egg, 33 FERTIL. STERIL. 117
(1980).
17. Jones, Jones, Andrews, Acosta, Bundren, Garcia, Sandow, Veeck, Wilkes, Witmyer,
Wortham & Wright, The Program for In Vitro Fertilization at Norfolk. 38 FERTIL. STERIL.
14 (1982). On February 17, 1983, the sixteenth baby from the Virginia Clinic was born. It
was a front-page story in its hometown of Minneapolis. MPLS. STAR, Feb. 19, 1983, p. 1.
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Medical Aspects
The "state of the art" is still developing, and there are as many varia-
tions in procedure as there are clinics involved in IVF. What follows
is a summary of general trends.
The protocol for management of patients participating in IVF
depends on whether oocytes are collected during a natural or stimu-
lated menstrual cycle. In the natural cycle approach, patients are not
treated with hormones or drugs, and usually only one follicle will
develop each ovulatory cycle. The timing of laparoscopy for oocyte
recovery is usually determined by daily measurement of estrogen
levels in the urine or plasma, and by ultrasonographic evaluation of
ovarian follicular size commencing on day nine or ten of the cycle."8
Twice-daily assays for urine or plasma samples for luteinizing hor-
mone (LH) to ascertain a sustained increase in excretion rate is used
to aid in the prediction of approaching ovulation. 9 Laparoscopy for
oocyte aspiration is performed about twenty-eight hours after the
onset of the LH surge, and a final ultrasonographic examination is
performed immediately prior to the procedure to verify that the an
intact follicle is still present.
The first three children born using IVF were conceived following
oocyte retrieval in the natural menstrual cycle. The disadvantages of
attempting IVF with natural ovulatory cycles include: (a) usually
only one preovulatory follicle is available for aspiration of an oocyte;
(b) protracted monitoring is required to detect the LH surge; (c) the
surgical team and facilities must be available twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week; (d) the overall pregnancy rate is lower than
with stimulated cycles where multiple follicles are available for
aspiration; and (e) the stress of the situation often results in
18. Johnson, Lopata, Speirs, Hoult, Kellow & DuPlessis, If Vitro Fertilization: The
Challenge of the Eighties. 36 FERTIL. STERIL. 699 (1981); DeCrespigny, O'Herlihy & Robin-
son, Ultrasound in In Vitro Fertilization. 35 FERTIL. STERIL. 25 (1981). Laparoscopy is the
visualization of the contents of the abdominal cavity by means of an optical instrument. This
procedure is usually preceeded by insuflation of the abdominal cavity with either carbon
dioxide or nitrous oxide gas. Without intervention, the ovum would be extruded into either
the peritoneal cavity or taken up by any remaining portion of the distal fallopian tube;
thereafter, it would resorb (i.e., dissolve and assimilate).
19. Testart, Frydman, Feinstein, Thebault, Roger & Scholler, Interpretation of Plasma
Luteinizing Hormone Assay for the Collection of Mature Oocvtes from Women: Definition
of Luteinizing Hormone Surge-Initiating Rise. 36 FERTIL. STERIL. 50 (1981); Seibel, Smith,
Levesque, Borten & Taymor. The Temporal Relationship between Luteinizing Hormone
Surge and Human Oocyte Maturation. 142 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 568 (1982).
204 Family Law Quarterly. Volume XVII. Number 2. Summer 1983
menstrual and ovarian follicle abnormalities. Accordingly, almost all
IVF centers now use stimulated ovulatory cycles.
For those women undergoing stimulated ovulations, successful
recovery of mature oocytes from unruptured follicles depends on cor-
rectly judging two moments: when maturation is reached, and when
follicular rupture spontaneously occurs. Clomiphene citrate (150
mg/day) is given on the fifth to ninth days of the menstrual cycle.20
The growth and development of follicles is assessed by daily ultra-
sonographic monitoring beginning four days after the initiation of
clomiphene adminstration.21 When the dominant ovarian follicle
reaches about 18 mm in diameter, estrogen levels are measured twice
daily. In the normal cycle, serum levels of estradiol peak at thirty-
three to thirty-six hours prior to the peak of luteinizing hormone.
Ovulation occurs after the LH peak. A plateau or slight decrease in
estradiol is a signal from the ovaries to the hypothalmus/
pituitary that the follicle is ready for ovulation. A blood sample is
then taken for rapid assay of the LH level, and 4,000-5,000 interna-
tional units of human chorionic gonadrotropins (hCG) are adminis-
tered. The hCG mimics the LH surge and thereby results in ovulation
of the primed follicle. If the blood LH level is basal, laparoscopy is
carried out thirty-six hours after the hCG injection. 1
Laparoscopy for oocyte recovery is usually performed under
general anesthesia.23 The follicular fluid is immediately examined
under a dissecting microscope, and where no oocyte is found, the
20. Clomiphene citrate is an orally active agent with a chemical structure similar to
estrogen; however, clomiphene itself does not have significant steroid effects. The
mechanism of action is to cause the hypothalmus to perceive the level of estrogen in the cir-
culation to be low. This obscured perception of low estrogen leads the hyothalmus to signal
the pituitary gland to stimulate the ovarian follicular apparatus. As in the normal cycle, the
rise in follicle-stimulating hormone secreted from the pituitary stimulates a set of follicles to
begin growth and maturation.
21. If the follicles appear small (i.e., less than 14 mm) additional stimulation in the form
of human menopausal gonadotropins is possible.
22. If the preinjection LH level is raised, indicating that the woman's own LH surge is
under way, then the cycle is abandoned, since the timing of ovulation is uncertain. LH rises
spontaneously in about 10 percent of cases. Mishell, In Vitro Fertilization: State of the
Art-What Can We Offer Patients? 20 CONTEMP. OB/GYNECOL. 219 (1982).
23. The pneumoperitoneum (insulflation of the abdominal cavity) is created with a gas
mixture of 90 percent nitrogen, 5 percent carbon dioxide, and 5 percent oxygen to avoid ex-
posing the oocyte to 100 percent carbon dioxide which may be harmful because of the
tendency to develop acidic follicular fluid. Johnson, supra note 18. This gas mixture must be
used with great caution because of the potential danger of gas embolism. Usually three ab-
dominal punctures are required-one for the laparoscope, another for a probe to manipulate
the ovary to gain access to all its surfaces, and a third for the aspirating instrument. A single-
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follicle is rinsed with culture medium and the contents are
reaspirated." ' With stimulated cycles, several ovarian follicles are
usually available for aspiration.
A semen specimen is obtained five to six hours following oocyte
retrieval and allowed to liquefy for about thirty minutes.2" After the
semen specimen is washed 6 and incubated for two hours, 0.5 to 1
million spermatozoa are added to each oocyte for eighteen hours. The
oocytes are then transferred into growth medium and allowed to in-
cubate for an additional twenty hours. About thirty-eight to forty
hours after insemination, the fertilized ovum's development is
assessed.
Pregnancies have been achieved following transfer of two-to-
sixteen-cell embryos,27 but the optimal stage for ET has not yet been
determined. Most investigators perform ET about forty-eight hours
after laparoscopy. 8 The Virginia researchers emphasize the impor-
tance of transferring more than one conceptus, per cycle if possible.
In their limited 1981 series, with the transfer of a single conceptus,
the pregnancy rate was 13 percent (two of fifteen cases) and with two
conceptuses, it was 31 percent (four of thirteen cases).2 9
lumen Teflon-lined needle of about 1.5 to 2.0 mm in internal diameter employing a 100 mm
mercury vacuum is utilized for follicle aspiration. Lopata, Johnston, Leeton, Muchnicki,
Talbot & Wood, Collection of Human Oocytes at Laparoscopy and Laparotomy, 25 FERTIL.
STERIL. 1030 (1974).
24. If the follicle has already ruptured at the time of laparascopy, the follicle and the
pouch of Douglas (area behind the uterus) are aspirated in an attempt to recover the oocyte.
The follicular fluid and oocyte must be kept at a constant temperature of 37*C in a water
bath.
25. During this time the oocytes are allowed to incubate at 37°C in culture medium
without spermatozoa which allows completion of maturation of the oocytes. Trounson,
Mohr, Wood, & Leeton, Effect of Delayed Insemination on In Vitro, Fertilization, Culture
and Transfer of Human Embryos. 64 J. REPROD. FERTIL. 285 (1982); Sathananthan &
Trounson, Ultrastructural Observations on Cortical Granules in Human Follicular Oocytes
Cultured In Vitro, 5 GAMETE RESEARCH 191 (1982).
26. If necessary, frozen semen may be used for insemination after washing.
27. Trounson & Wood, Extracorporeal Fertilization and Embryo Transfer. 8 CLIN.
OBSTET. GYNECOL. 681 (1981); Edwards, Steptoe & Purdy, Establishing Full-Term Human
Pregnancies Using Cleaving Embryos Grown In Vitro, 87 BRIT. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 737
(1980).
28. The woman is premedicated with a sedative or hypnotic agent and placed in either the
left-lateral position or the lithotomy position. After the cervix and the upper vagina are
cleaned with tissue culture medium, a Teflon-lined catheter with a hole in the side of the tip
is introduced through the cervical canal into the uterine cavity for ET. A column of air
precedes the fluid containing the embryo. After the embryo is injected, a delay of about one
minute before removal of the catheter is recommended to facilitate dispersal of the embryo.
Finally, the catheter is inspected under a dissecting microscope to assure that the embryo has
been expelled.
29. Jones, supra note 17. On two occasions, they transferred three conceptuses, with one
resulting pregnancy.
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Following ET, the patient is usually required to remain at bedrest
for about twenty-four hours. Blood samples are obtained commenc-
ing seven days after laparoscopy and assayed for plasma progesterone
and human chorionic gonadotropin to monitor continued embryonic
growth. Ultrasonographic studies are performed beginning at about
eight weeks gestation to determine the number of fetuses and to con-
tinue monitoring fetal viability and growth. Otherwise, management
of the pregnancy is routine.
Results of IVF and ET Programs
Assessing the "success rates" of IVF and ET programs is difficult
because of varying definitions of success, e.g., some investigators
report an ectopic pregnancy as a success. The success rate is also
likely to vary between programs, and even within a single group,
because of the complex variables involved. Some investigators base
their success rate on pregnancies per ET. Another method is
pregnancies per laparoscopy.
A recent survey indicated that, in England, Steptoe and Edwards
have performed about 600 laparoscopies for oocyte retrieval with a
pregnancy rate of approximately 16 percent. In Australia, at the
Royal Women's Hospital, Melbourne, about 300 laparoscopies were
performed in 1981 with only seventeen pregnancies (5 percent); only
four continued beyond sixteen weeks gestation. At the Queen Vic-
toria Hospital, Melbourne, the pregnancy rate ranged between 10
percent and 20 percent, depending on the drugs used to stimulate the
cycles (the number of laparoscopies was not quoted). At the Universi-
ty of Southern California, Los Angeles, twenty-five laparoscopies
have been performed with four pregnancies.30 At the Eastern Vir-
ginia Medical School, seven pregnancies were reported following
ninety-six laparoscopies. 31
Among the pregnancies established following IVF, there have been
two abnormalities reported: a spontaneous abortion of a triploid
fetus,32 and the birth of a child with transposition of the major vessels
30. Mishell. supra note 22.
31. Jones, supra note 17.
32. A triploid has sixty-nine chromosomes rather than the normal number of forty-six.
Steptoe, Edwards & Purdy, Clinical Aspects of Pregnancies Established with Cleaving
Embryos Grown In Vitro, 87 BRIT. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 757 (1980).
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of the heart.33 The limited available data thus do not suggest an in-
creased frequency of congenital abnormalities among IVF concep-
tuses. However, continued monitoring is mandatory to establish ac-
curate frequencies. In experienced IVF clinics, the frequency of
spontaneous abortions also does not seem to be in excess of that ex-
pected for natural conceptions in a population of infertility patients
(12 percent to 18 percent).3 ' Finally, the several tubal pregnancies
reported following IVF3  are not unexpected, since most of these
women have remnants of severely damaged fallopian tubes which
might predispose toward ectopic implantation.
The Legal Issues
IVF has been the subject of a major report by the federal Ethics Ad-
visory Board,36 more than a dozen law review articles and notes,3"
and one civil lawsuit.38 There are some professional guidelines in
33. Wood, Trounson, Leeton, Renou, Walters, Buttery, Grimwade, Spensley & Yu,
Clinical Features of Eight Pregnancies Resulting from In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer. 38 FERTIL. STERIL. 22 (1982).
34. Trounson & Conti, Research in Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer,
285 BR. MED. J. 244 (1982).
35. Steptoe & Edwards, supra note 14; Smith, Pike, Tucker, Sinosich, Kemp, Picker &
Saunders, Tubal Pregnancy Occurring after Successful In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer. 38 FERTIL. STERIL. 105 (1982).
36. See supra note 2.
37. See. e.g., Katz, Legal Implications and Regulation of In Vitro Fertilization, in A.
MILUNSKY, & G.J. ANNAS eds., GENETICS AND THE LAW II (1982) 351-367; Flannery,
Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fer-
tilization. 67 GEO. L.J. 1295 (1979); Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fer-
tile Areas for Litigation. 35 Sw. L.J. 973 (1982); Note, The 'Brave New Baby* and the Law:
Fashioning Remedies for the Victims of In Vitro Fertilization, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 319
(1978); Comment, Lawmaking and Science: A Practical Look at In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer, 1979 DET. C. L. REV. 429; Comment. Love's Labor Lost: Legal and
Ethical Implications in Artificial Human Procreation. 58 J. URB. L. 459 (1981); Oakley, Test
Tube Babies, 8 FAM. L.Q. 385 (1974); Comment. New Reproductive Technologies: The
Legal Problem and a Solution. 49 TENN. L. REV. 303 (1982); Mason, Abnormal Conception.
56 AUST. L.J. 347 (1982).
38. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 12, 1978) a jury
returned a verdict for $50,000 in favor of prospective parents who sought recovery for their
pain and suffering caused by the deliberate destruction of a potential embryo (the sperm had
been introduced into the dish containing the oocyte, but fertilization had not yet been con-
firmed) by the hospital's chief of obstetrics and gynecology. The chief contended that the
IVF procedure represented risky experimentation that had not been approved by the
hospital's IRB. See Flannery supra note 37 at 1344-45, and Katz, supra note 37 at 359-360.
See generally on civil liability, Hubble, Liability of the Physician for the Defects of a Child
Caused by In Vitro Fertilization, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 501 (1981); and Palm & Hirsh, Legal Im-
plications of Artificial Conception. 28 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 404 (1982).
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specific countries39 and at specific medical institutions,4" but no state
or federal statutes or regulations have been adopted which are sup-
portive of IVF.41 Even though the medical and technical aspects of
IVF (described above) are still evolving, there is much more consen-
sus regarding the technical aspects of IVF than about its legal
aspects. In the remainder of this article we review the current legal
status of IVF, and make some suggestions regarding future regula-
tion.
The Status of the Embryo
The most ethically and politically controversial aspect of IVF is the
status of the embryo. Some opponents argue that a fertilized egg is a
human being, and failure to reimplant it should be considered
murder.4 An analogous view has been put into an Illinois statute
which requires the physician who performs IVF to assume the "care
and custody" of the embryo, subject to the penalties of the child abuse
statute should any harm befall it.4 The constitutionality of the statute
has been unsuccessfully challenged by a physician and his patients, a
married couple, who allege that it prevents them from employing IVF
in violation of the couple's constitutional right to privacy and that it is
unconstitutionally vague. The essence of the argument is that the
39. See supra note 3 and Report of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
on In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Replacement or Transfer, RCOG, London, March
1983.
40. E.g., Queen Victoria Medical Centre, Melbourne, Australia. Reprinted in W.
WALTERS. & P. SINGER, eds., TEST TUBE BABIES at 146-47 (1982).
41. Illinois has a statute directly on IVF (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7)(1981). See
infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. Other states have fetal research statutes that
might be interpreted to affect IVF. The Massachusetts fetal research statute, for example, is
broad enough to encompass research with embryos (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J) and
prevented any IVF activity in Massachusetts until March 1983 when the district attorney for
the district in which Boston's major teaching hospitals are located said that if all the fertil-
ized eggs used were implanted in the woman, IVF "would appear to be in total compliance
with the law." McLaughlin, Hub Hospitals Plan Test-Tube Fertilizations, Boston Globe.
March 2, 1983 at 1.
42. See, e.g., discussions in WALTERS & SINGER. supra note 40; and Krimmel & Foley,
Abortion: An Inspection into the Nature of Human Life and the Potential Consequences of
Legalizing Its Destruction, 46 U. CIN._L. REV. 725, 756-57 (1977).
43. Any person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum by a human
sperm outside the body of a living human female shall, with regard to the human being
thereby produced, be deemed to have the care and custody of a child for the purposes of § 4
of the Act to Prevent and Punish Wrongs to Children, approved May 17, 1977, as amended,
[ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2354 (1981)] except that nothing in that Section shall be construed
to attach any penalty to participation in the performance of a lawful pregnancy termination.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7)(1981).
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statute's primary purpose is to prohibit IVF and that such a prohibi-
tion cannot be constitutionally accomplished by protecting embryonic
life against the mother's interests prior to viability."' This argument
seems correct. The Supreme Court has ruled that there is a right not to
procreate, and this right seems best understood as a right not to have the
state interfere in procreative decisions. The right at stake is "privacy,"
and it would seem that the decision by an infertile couple, made in con-
cert with their physician, to undergo IVF for the purposes of having a
child, should be constitutionally protected. The state has no obligation
to foster IVF research or to pay for IVF procedures with Medicaid funds,
but it probably does have an obligation not to interfere with such proce-
dures unless it can demonstrate a compelling interest.45
The only candidate for a compelling interest seems to be preserving
respect for human life by respecting the embryo. Reimplanting the
embryo would accomplish this; but what about discarding "excess"
embryos? The attorney general of the State of Illinois, Neil Hartigan,
and the state's attorney of Cook County, Richard M. Daley, defended
the statute by interpreting it in a way that would not interfere with the
IVF procedure contemplated by the plaintiffs. They specifically
limited physician custody to the preimplantation period, and limited
the duty imposed on the physician as refraining "from wilfully en-
dangering or injuring" the conceptus. Should the conceptus be found
defective and its development terminated for this reason, the defen-
dants interpreted this as a lawful termination of pregnancy decision
on the part of the physician. 6 In his memorandum opinion, Judge
Joel Flaum adopted the interpretation of the statute of the defen-
44. Smith v. Fahner, No. 82 C 4234 (N.D. Ill.); now named Smith v. Hartigan.
45. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 U980); and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); and see discussion in Flannery supra note 37 at
1300-1307 and Robertson Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception. Pregnancy and
Childbirth. VA. L. REv. (April, 1983, in press).
46. The defendants did not, however, explain why the same logic regarding pregnancy ter-
mination would not appy to an apparently normal conceptus. The opinions set forth in the
defendant's memorandum detailing their interpretation of the statute do not have the force
of law. Nevertheless, Judge Flaum noted in his decision, "there is a long history of their use
in this State which suggests that they are far more than the personal reflections of the current
office holder. Indeed, the opinions can have collateral effects for state officers who rely on or
ignore them and the opinions are accorded considerable weight in the courts when a question
of first impression is raised regarding the construction of an Illinois statute." Smith v. Har-
tigan, 82 C 4324 (D.C. Ill.. Feb. 4, 1983) (slip op., Flaum, J.)
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dants, and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
since under that interpretation there was nothing to prohibit the
plaintiffs from proceeding with IVF and therefore no "case or con-
troversy." As to the issue of multiple embryos, the judge decided it
was not properly before him since the plaintiffs did not "indicate that
the superovulation technique will be used by them." Almost all com-
mentators have agreed that the embryo, even if not accorded human
status, is worthy of respect."7 Two possible compromise "solutions"
now exist. The first is to reimplant all embryos into the woman. This
solution, which seems reasonable if only two or three are involved,
now seems to have been adopted by many clinics since it seems to in-
crease the probability of a pregnancy. 8 The second solution is more
controversial. "Excess" embryos would be frozen.49 This permits
their use in future cycles should the initial attempts fail, and in future
pregnancies, but also raises the possibility of use in another couple or
in a surrogate mother. The surrogate and donor scenarios are
discussed later in this article.50
Indications
Medically, IVF and ET have been developed primarily to permit
married couples with infertility, due to the wife's irreparable fallo-
pian tube disease, to have children. IVF may also prove useful in
cases where the husband has a low sperm count or other semen ab-
normalities such as low sperm motility. A more controversial indica-
tion is "idiopathic infertility" where evaluation of the couple (i.e.,
history, physical examination, laparoscopy, testing of fallopian tube
patency, endocrine profiles, semen analysis, etc.) reveals no cause for
infertility. An estimated 10 to 15 percent of infertile couples fall into
47. E.g.. Richard McCormick. S.J.. "Some persons see the fertilized ovum as a person
with all the claims and rights of persons. Others view it as disposable material. Still others
take a position between these other two. acknowledging the fertilized ovum as a living (not
dead) human (noncanine) being, deserving of awe, respect, even if not meriting the fullest
range of protections we accord persons." Correspondence, Hastings Center Report. Dec.
1979 at 4.
48. Jones, supra note 17,
49. This procedure is currently being used in Australia.
50. A related issue to IVF is the use of "spare" embryos for research purposes. Discussion
of this aspect is beyond the scope of this article. See generaly Grobstein. The Moral Use of
Spare Embryos. II HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 5 (June. 1982); GROBSTEIN supra note 4 at
114-125; Johnstone, The Moral Status of the Embryo in SINGER & WALTERS. supra note 40
at 49-63; New UK Row and Embryo Research. 299 NATURE 383 (1982).
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this category. Possible explanations include immunologic factors,
undiagnosed abnormalities of oocyte or sperm transport, undefined
physical or chemical barriers preventing sperm penetration of the
ovum, genetic abnormalities, and unrecognized uterine abnor-
malities. Virtually all cases of infertility, exclusive of intractable
anovulation and those women without a uterus, are potential medical
candidates for IVF.
Legally and ethically, who should be considered a candidate for
IVF and ET? For example, should single women with fallopian tube
disease be considered candidates for the procedure? This question
should probably be answered the same as, "Should single women be
considered candidates for AID,"'" i.e., should medical technology be
used to assist in the creation of single-parent families? The Ethics
Advisory Board has recommended that IVF be restricted to married
couples."2 In Australia, it has been recommended (even more restric-
tively) that, while it is acceptable to favor married couples who have
had children during the experimentation phase, after IVF becomes
established procedure, priority should be given to those married
couples who have not had any children. 3 This issue needs to be
resolved on a broader base than medical practice since the issues in-
volved are not medical. Should we use technology to encourage
single-parent families? The creation of children for lesbian couples?
Transsexual couples? 4 The answer to these questions is not obvious,
but the issues are complex enough that, at least until the medical
aspects of IVF are standardized, it seems reasonable to put the
burden of proof on those who do not want to restrict IVF to married
couples that children do as well in alternate family settings as they do
in traditional ones. One good reason for such a policy is that restric-
tion of IVF to married couples until IVF becomes an accepted
51. Apparently only about 10 percent of practitioners of AID will use it for single women.
Currie-Cohen, Luttree & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in
the United States. 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979). While there have been no decided
lawsuits on this question, after the filing of a lawsuit brought on behalf of a 36-year-old
divorcee who applied for artificial insemination and was rejected because she was single,
Wayne State University agreed in 1980 to include single women in its artificial insemination
program. See N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981) at 256-57.
52. See supra note 2.
53. See WALTERS & SINGER. supra note 40.
54. For an insightful discussion of these and related issues see Somerville, Birth
Technology. Parenting and 'Deviance'. 5 INT'L J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 123 (1982). And see
Tiefel. Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Conservative View. JAMA 247: 3235, 3238 (1982).
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medical practice is likely to strengthen public support for IVF itself.
Selection of Patients
Couples seeking IVF must undergo genetic evaluation. For example,
Jewish couples should be screened to determine their carrier status for
Tay-Sachs disease. If both are carriers, antenatal diagnosis is appro-
priate. There are relatively few medical contraindications to IVF, s
although there is a need for psychological counseling due to the high
failure rates. 56 A screening laparoscopy should be performed to deter-
mine whether the ovaries are accessible for oocyte collection. S7 At least
at this stage of its development, there is probably no more "right" to be
a recipient of IVF technology than there is a right to receive an artificial
heart or a heart transplant.5 " If a medical facility does have a set of
screening guidelines, however, the guidelines must be reasonable, and
applied fairly.
Informed Consent
IVF is still an experimental procedure (although it is likely to soon be
viewed as standard medical procedure), so the rules relating to consent
to human experimentation should be observed. 9 The wife's consent
55. Some investigators have reservations about using women over thirty-five because of the
increased risk of chromosomal abnormalities, such as Down Syndrome. Steptoe, supra note
32. However, pregnancies can be monitored via mid-trimester amniocentesis. Because of
theoretical risks, some investigators recommend that all couples undergoing IVF should be
counseled about amniocentesis for prenatal diagnosis regardless of age. Although the
number of pregnancies following IVF are still limited (under 200), the risk of abnormalities
among infants born following IVF does not appear to be in excess of that expected for nor-
mal fertilization. For obstetrical reasons, women with serious medical illnesses (e.g., severe
diabetes mellitus or heart disease) should be discouraged from attempting pregnancy.
56. Trounson & Wood, Extracorporeal Fertilization and Embryo Transfer. 8 CLIN.
OBsTET. GYNECOL. 681 (1981).
57. The screening laparoscopy may be timed at midcycle since there is a possibility that a
mature ovarian follicle may be aspirated at this initial investigation. If only one ovary is ac-
cessible, IVF can be restricted to cycles when mature follicles are developing in that ovary, as
determined by ultrasonographic monitoring (discussed below). Occasionally, intra-
abdominal adhesions or disease (e.g., endometriosis) may necessitate a laparotomy to free
one or both ovaries to permit future ovarian accessibility. This usually involves suturing the
supporting ovarian ligaments to the lateral pelvic wall to stabilize the ovary in the anterior
portion of the pelvis.
58. See Annas, Allocating Artificial Hearts in the Year 2002: Minerva v. National Health
Service. 3 AM. J. LAW & MED. 59 (1977).
59. While there are no specific federal regulations applying to IVF, after implantation the
regulations on fetal research apply, and prior to implantation the suggestions of the EAB
should be followed. See Katz, supra note 37; EAB supra note 2; and see generally. G.J. AN-
NAS. L.H. GLANTZ. & B.F. KATZ. INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE
SUBJECT'S DILEMMA (1977).
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must be both informed and knowledgeable. Since IVF involves the use
of the husband's sperm, he should also be fully informed and give his
own consent to the entire procedure. The would-be child, of course,
cannot consent. Because of this, it has been suggested that the child
might be able to sue the physician and/or its parents for "wrongful
life" should it be born defective.6 ° We do not believe any "wrongful
life" lawsuit by or on behalf of the child should be permitted in the
absence of negligence on the part of the physician or clinic. 1
Nonetheless, since the would-be child is an innocent third party to the
IVF agreement between the parents and the physician, we believe that
all involved have an ethical obligation to protect the would-be child's
interest 2.6  As Hans Tiefel has argued, "No one has the moral right to
endanger a child while there is yet an option of whether the child shall
come into existence." 63 The state can also properly step in to regulate
IVF on the basis of protecting the would-be child's interests in in-
stances where there may be a conflict between the interests of the
would-be child and those of the parents and physician. "We must
60. See, e.g.. Hubble supra note 38; Capron, The Continuing Wrong of 'Wrongful Life' in
A. MILUNSKY. & G.J. ANNAS. eds. GENETICS AND THE LAW 11 (1981) at 81-93, and Furrow,
The Causes of 'Wrongful Life' Suits: Remunerations on the Diffusion of Medical
Technologies, 10 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE (Feb. 1982).
61. The basic reason for not permitting suits against the parents is twofold: (1) the parents
are obligated to care for the child in any event, and unless they give the child up for adoption,
the money a child might obtain in such a suit would be used to care for the child anyway; (2)
such a suit would be disruptive of family life. It has been argued that no lawsuit for
"wrongful life" should lie against a negligent physician either, because the critical element of
such a lawsuit is the contention that but for the negligence of the physician, the child would
not have been born at all (e.g., if the physician had properly inspected the embryo or proper-
ly performed amniocentesis, the physician would have recognized a significant defect and
counseled the mother to abort). The argument is that it is impossible to assess damages since
this requires a comparison of life with a defect versus no life at all. The contrary argument is
that the child is not arguing that it would rather be dead, but is arguing that given a choice it
would have choosen not to exist. Since it was not given that choice and it therefore does exist,
it should be compensated for a wrong done that led to its defective existence. The counter
argument is that it was not the wrong that led to its defect: it was defective to begin with and
so never had the option of being born healthy, only of not being born or being born defective.
Since the physician did not cause the defect, he should not have to pay for it. This seems cor-
rect in general; nevertheless, recent cases in California and Washington have upheld
wrongful life suits on the basis that special damages can be proven and the physician was in
fact negligent, and if damages were not awarded, we would have a wrong without a remedy.
The argument in favor of awarding damages is primarily an insurance argument and a deter-
rent argument (we want someone to help pay for the child's medical care, and we want to
deter negligence on the part of physicians and clinics). Since the courts are split (and seem
likely to remain so). legislative action may be appropriate. See generally Taub, Wrongful
Life: Its Problems Are Not Just Semantic. 10 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 208 (1982);
Annas. Righting the Wrong of "Wrongful Life.' 11(1) HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 8 (Feb.
1981).
62. See generally E. PARTRIDGE. (ed.) RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1981).
63. Tiefel, supra note 54 at 3238.
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weigh the chances for the well-being of the child while we yet have a
choice about initiating this life. Would-be parents have moral obliga-
tions to a would-be child."
64
There is unlikely to be any conflict between the best interests of the
child and a married couple applying for IVF, even using donor
oocytes. However, should the embryo be transferred not to the wife,
but to a surrogate child bearer (popularly referred to as a "surrogate
mother") who bears the child for the wife, many potential problems
arise.
Donor Oocyte Embryos
Donor oocytes fertilized in vitro with the recipient's husband's sperm
or by donor sperm may be used for embryo transfer in the following
situations: (a) the recipient lacks ovaries either because of a genetic
disorder (e.g., gonadal dysgenesis) or because they have been
surgically removed; (b) the ovaries are inaccessible for oocyte
retrieval due to pelvic disease; or (c) premature menopause. Either
the ovulatory cycle of the recipient must be synchronized with that of
the donor by hormal manipulation, or deep-frozen embryos could be
thawed and transferred at the appropriate time.6" On a theoretical
basis, disparity between the genetic makeup of the donor oocyte and
that of the recipient might result in immunologic complications
resulting in either spontaneous abortion or hydatidiform mole (a be-
nign tumor of placental tissue). The following discussion assumes
that such immunologic problems either do not exist or can be over-
come.
The issues raised by use of donor oocytes are analogous to those
raised by AID.66 In each case a human is donating or selling his or
her gametes for the purpose of enabling a member of the opposite sex
to have a child. The primary differences involve the risks to the
64. Id.
65. Dr. Alan Trounson working at Monash University. Melbourne, Australia, acknowl-
edged that "... eggs had been donated in 10 to 15 women who had no ovaries, who had
ovaries from which eggs could not be obtained, or who had genetic diseases that could be
passed on. He said that he preferred not to comment on the success of the transplants, but he
did comment that 'this looks like a technique which will work. "' 6 PHYSICIAN'S WASHINGTON
REP. 5 (Dec. 1982).
66. For a discussion of these issues as they relate to AID. see Annas. AID: Belond the Best
Interests of the Sperm Donor. 14 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1980).
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woman in having the oocyte removed and the much smaller number
of oocytes a woman can donate (usually only one at a time) as com-
pared with the number of sperm a man can donate. These dif-
ferences suggest that: (1) oocyte donors should be screened much
more carefully than sperm donors have been, since they should not
be put at any risk if their oocytes are unlikely to aid (and may even be
harmful to) the donee; (2) oocyte vendors, if paid, should be paid
substantially more for their oocytes than sperm vendors are paid for
their sperm; and (3) complete medical records should be maintained
on the donor or vendor so that she can be matched with resulting
children should a genetic disease or disorder appear. Also, it may be
in the interests of the child to be told the identity of his or her genetic
mother, and if this can be demonstrated, the information should be
available. 67
While donor oocytes have the advantage that they can be fertilized
with the husband's sperm, they may be difficult to obtain. Accord-
ingly, there may be some incentive to freeze "excess" embryos ob-
tained from IVF procedures and offer them to infertile couples as a
form of "prenatal adoption." '68 This is the next step on the "slippery
slope" of external fertilization about which individuals such as Leon
67. Id. Current evidence is insufficient to conclude that access should be mandatory, but
while studies go on, the information should be retained.
68. To increase the flexibility of the timing of ET, techniques for embryo preservation are
required. Indeed, Trounson and Conti (1982) have suggested that in vitro clinics may have
an obligation to develop preservation methods so that in circumstances where embryos can-
not be transplanted-because of illness or unexpected difficulty-or where excess embryos
develop they are not disposed of or used for other purposes. Research in Human In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer. 285 BRIT. MED. J. 244 (1982). Preliminary investigations
into the deep-freezing (cryopreservation) of human embryos indicate that following thawing
continued growth and development in culture is possible. Trounson, Leeton, Wood. Webb,
& Wood, Pregnancies in Humans by Fertilization In Vitro and Embryo Transfer in the Con-
trolled Ovulatory Cycle. 212 SCIENCE 681 (1981). Trounson and Wood have reported the
transfer of two such embryos in women without resulting pregnancies. See supra note 56.
Although animal data has not indicated an increased risk of fetal abnormalities as compared
to nonfrozen embryos, extrapolation to human embryos may not necessarily be valid. Thus,
a high degree of caution must be exercised prior to applying cryopreservation to human em-
br-yos. And see Craft & Yovich, Implications of Embryo Transfer. LANCET 642 (Sept. 22,
1979) who state that "90 percent of patients undergoing elective sterilization are prepared to
donate ova for an approved research study and at least half of these would allow ova to be
donated to an infertile couple." See also Two teams attempt implantation of "donor em-
bryos ": Australians achieve an "adoptive "pregnancy. Medical World News. May 9. 1983 at
9; and Schmeck Prenatal Adoption Is the Objective of a New Technique. New York Times,
June 14, 1983 at Cl.
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Kass and Paul Ramsey have expressed grave fears.69 Why? The argu-
ment, on one level at least, is that there is a difference in kind, not
degree, between oocytes, sperm, blood and kidneys on the one hand,
and an embryo on the other. There is general societal agreement that
it is morally and legally wrong to sell a human being. The issue is
whether sale or commercialization in embryos will lead to a general
feeling that embryos, fetuses and children are commodities, and can
be treated like commodities (defective children returned, differential
fees charged for "higher quality" embryos, etc.). One can envision
catalogs of embryos, with pictures and personal histories of the
sperm and oocyte vendors, from which prospective parents can
choose their own "dream child." '7 This does not strike us as an ad-
vance and certainly moves IVF outside the realm of medical interven-
tion for specific disease condition, and into the realm of commercial
products available for a wide variety of personal reasons. While not
quantifiable, the dangers inherent in marketing embryos seem to us
sufficiently grave to suggest a policy that prohibits traffic in them.71
Surrogate Childbearers
Another potential option is to have the embryo transferred to the
uterus of a surrogate childbearer. While this has not yet been done to
our knowledge, it could be used for three medical indications and
one personal one: (a) hysterectomy, (b) abnormal uterus (e.g., a
bicornuate uterus), (c) Mullerian aplasia (i.e., congentially absent
uterus), and (d) a preference not to undergo the physical experience
of pregnancy. With the inclusion of (d), IVF could potentially be
available to all women who can produce oocytes. The question is
whether it should be.
69. Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and the Old Morality. 26 PUBLIC INTEREST 18
(1972); Kass, Ethical Issues in Human In Vitro Fetilization. Embryo Culture and Research.
and Embryo Transfer. Appendix to EAB REPORT, supra note 2; and P. RAMSEY,
FABRICATED MAN (1970).
70. See, e.g.. a suggestion that sperm banks market directly to women. ADVERTISING AGE,
May 14, 1979 at 30. The reasons for prohibiting a market in various things are complex, and
not all will agree with us about the dangers of an embryo market. See generally M. WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) at 97-103.
71. While beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that IVF may also lead to the
development of microsurgical techniques to manipulate defective embryos. It is now well
established that among natural human fertilizations about 50 percent of first trimester spon-
taneous abortions are chromosomally abnormal. Elias & Simpson, Evaluation and Clinical
Management of Patients at Apparent Increased Risk for Spontaneous Abortions. PORTER
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IVF itself closes a circle: oral contraceptives effectively separated
sex from having children; IVF separates having children from sex.
Surrogate childbearers go the next step: procreation is divorced not
only from sex, but also from any anticipation of child rearing. The
experience of surrogate childbearers in the United States to date (us-
ing AID, not IVF) strongly suggests that this method of procreation
should be discouraged by medical and legal practitioners alike.
The most recent chapter in the surrogate mother saga-where real
life makes the soap operas appear pallid-involved Alexander
Malahoff, who contracted with Judy Stiver for her to be artificially
inseminated with his sperm and bear him a child. Malahoff was
separated from his wife and hoped the baby might help reunite them.
The child was born January 10; 1983, with microcephaly. Mrs. Stiver
immediately disavowed any responsibility, claiming the child was not
hers. Malahoff likewise refused to take the child, claiming it was not
his. Blood and tissue typing tests later upheld Malahoff. Prior to the
insemination they had entered into a contract, the only instrument
that in any way defined their respective rights and responsibilities
and one all lawyers involved believe is probably unenforceable in a
court. The contract specified that Stiver was to refrain from having
AND HOOK. eds., EMBRYONIC AND FETAL DEATH (1980) at 331. Based upon the assumption
that 15 percent of pregnancies result in spontaneous abortions, one can conclude that about
7 percent of all human conceptions are chromosomally abnormal. Presumably, a similar fre-
quency of chromosomally abnormal embryos exists among those originating from IVF.
Thus, if chromosomal studies could be performed on the embryo prior to transfer, one could
avoid transferring a chromosomally abnormal conceptus which would be destined to-either
abort or result in a stillborn or liveborn child with a chromosomal abnormality. Using
microsurgical techniques, one or several cells could be removed from the early embryo for
chromosomal analysis. Because cells from such early embryos are thought to be totipotential,
it would not be unreasonable to assume that continued normal development would ensue
after such sampling. It has been demonstrated in animal studies that genetically identical
offspring can result from the division of two- and four-cell embryos. Willadeen, A Method
for Culture of Micromanipulated Sheep Embryos and Its Use to Produce Monozygotic
Twins. 277 NATURE 298 (1979). Similar microtechniques could be developed to detect other
genetic disorders (e.g., inborn errors of metabolism).
Finally, cells could be incorporated into early embryos to complement for a genetic defi-
ciency. For example, if the metabolic pathway of an embryo was known to lack a given en-
zyme, a cell (or cells) known to have that enzyme functioning properly could be
"transplanted" into the embryo. Alternatively, pieces of DNA could be "spliced" into the
genome of the embryo to correct for a particular genetic disorder. Such recombinant DNA
research has already proved useful in bacterial systems to produce desired gene products
such as insulin. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. SPLICING LIFE. THE SOCIAL AND
ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS (1982), and Motulsky,
Impact of Genetic Manipulation on Socier. and Medicine. 219 SCIENCE 135 (1983).
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intercourse with her husband for thirty days after the insemination
but remarkably mentioned nothing about the days prior to the
insemination. While Malahoff's immediate problem was resolved (he
is quoted as saying, "Instead of a baby, I end up with a lawyer"),
72
ours is not as easily solved. As Roger Rosenblatt noted, "A procedure
has been devised in which a human being is literally conceived as a
manufactured product. Therefore, consciously or not, all the par-
ticipants in that procedure tend to regard the product either as the
flower of a growth industry or, if a flap appears, as industrial
waste.""'
Attorney Noel Keane, who considers himself the "father" of sur-
rogate motherhood, has described in his recent book7 1 the in-
dividuals involved in the first surrogate cases he handled. In one of
his first cases, the surrogate extorted money from the couple both
before and after the birth of the child (who was born with fetal
alcohol syndrome). In another, the couple in the market for a sur-
rogate was infertile because the woman was an alleged transsexual
who had had a sex change operation. In that case the surrogate
decided to keep the child and a court battle between the New York
couple and the California surrogate for joint custody was begun.7" A
third involved a single man who wanted to have a son but did not
want to get married.
72. NEWSWEEK. Feb. 14, 1983 at 76. And see BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 3. 1983 at 3.
73. Rosenblatt, The Baby in the Factory. TIME, Feb. 14. 1983 at 90.
74. KEANE supra note 51. Noel Keane has argued that single males are legally in a very
good position to pay for the services of a surrogate, even in states that prohibit payment for
adoptions (see infra notes and accompanying text) because the father-sperm donor is the
biological father of the child so no adoption is required on his part. KEANE, supra note 51.
Keane has also taken a client who wishes to donate his sperm to an "infertile white couple"
who would then have "his" child and raise it themselves. He would set up a trust fund for the
child ($20,000) and would "be like an uncle to it." Keane acted as the man's attorney and
placed ads for him in the Detroit Free Press and The Village Voice. After choosing the cou-
ple, it was decided not to enter into an elaborate written agreement because, according to
Mr. Keane, "They met and came to trust each other." NATL L. J., Jan. 17. 1983 at 3. While
there is no law prohibiting such an arrangement. it does not strike us as one lawyers ought to
be involved in or encourage since the effects on the child and the family are very problematic.
and the motivations of the donor "uncle" bizarre at best. Indeed, the "uncle sperm donor"
case merely serves to underline the reproductive free-for-all attitude that seems to say any
way to have a child is legitimate no matter how bizzare.
75. See also Surrogate Mother-to-Be Fights to Keep Unborn Child. N.Y. Times. March
25, 1981 at A12. In a hearing prior to the birth the judge ruled that the surrogate could name
the child, but that custody would not be determined until after the child was born. In a set-
tlement agreement. the surrogate retains custody and the father is acknowledged on the birth
certificate. Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview. 16 FAM. L.Q. 289.
298 (1983).
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Attorney Keane concludes from his experiences that state legisla-
tion is necessary to regulate the procedure.76 Legislation has already
been introduced in a number of states, including Michigan. 7 But
before we rush to legislate, we should be clear on the issues at stake.
A full discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article, and
many others have written about regulating surrogate motherhood.78
We suggest, nonetheless, that two interrelated concerns should be
paramount in any legislative or regulatory scheme: the best interests
of the child, and the minimization of commercial aspects of the
transaction. As to the first, the would-be child must be seen not only
as the end-product of a surrogate transaction, but as the party who
deserves the most protection. The child cannot speak for
himself/herself or represent his or her own interests, and we (as
potential parents and as a society) have an obligation to guard the
child from harm.79 That the would-be child does not in fact exist
when the contract is entered into and therefore cannot be said to
possess any "rights" does not diminish our ethical obligation to take
all reasonable steps to protect the would-be child's welfare.80 To give
76. KEANE, supra note 51 at 264-267, and Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate
Motherhood. 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147, 169. [The identical article appears as Black, Legal
Problems of Surrogate Motherhood. 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373 (1981).
77. On Feb. 8, 1983 Representative Richard Fitzpatrick of Battle Creek introduced H.B.
4114, a "Bill to Regulate Surrogate Parenting." His proposal, which seems drafted primarily
to deal with cases like Malahoff (see supra note 69 and accompanying text) would clarify
parental identity of the parties involved, and legalize the procedure. Substitute drafts were
sent out by his office on May 9 and June 2, 1983. Senator Connie Binsfield of Maple City will
reportedly introduce legislation to outlaw surrogate arrangements in Michigan. Martin,
Legislature Gets Surrogate Parenting Measure, Detroit News, Feb. 9, 1983 at 10c; and see
Lansing State J., Jan. 25, 1983 at 6A and Detroit Free Press, Jan. 25, 1983 at 12 for editorials
in favor of legislation. " If the state of Michigan is ultimately going to recognize surrogate
parent arrangements, comprehensive legislation is needed to resolve profound societal con-
cerns related to the rights, obligations and interests of all parties .. " Syrkoski v. Ap-
pleyard (Mich. Cir. Ct.. Wayne Co., Nov. 25. 1981) 8 F.L.R. 2139. Other states with pen-
ding legislation include South Carolina (H.B. 3491) and Alabama (H.B. 593). The South
Carolina legislation would regulate surrogate agreements; the Alabama legislation would
outlaw them.
78. See. e.g.. Note. Surrogate Motherhood in California: Legislative Proposals. 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 341 (1981); Comment. Parenthood bv Proxy: Legal Implications of Surrogate
Birth. 67 IOWA L. REV. 385 (1982); Harris, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate
Motherhood: A Nurserv Full of Unresolved Questions. 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 913 (1981);
Comment. Contracts to Bear a Child. 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1978); Note. Surrogate
Mothers: The Legal Issues. 7 AM. J. LAW & MED. 323 (1981) Keane, supra note 73; Note,
Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U.
RICH. L. REV. 467 (1982).
79. See. supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
80. PATRIDGE. supra note 62, and Annas, supra note 66. "It makes good moral sense
never to beget offspring when would-be parents cannot reasonably ensure a future child a
fair chance at health." Tiefel. supra note 54 at 3238.
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one example, current surrogate contracts do not generally take ac-
count of the child's possible desire to know the identity of its bio-
logical mother.81 We suggest that from the child's perspective, the
child should be given at least a contractual right to this information,
although the exercise of this right could probably be postponed until
the child reached the age of majority. Likewise, the would-be child
would likely prefer to have two parents of the opposite sex who have
accepted legal responsibility prior to birth, since this would probably
provide the would-be child with more financial and psychological
protection than would a single parent, and is consistent with current
societal preferences.
The second issue has been the one that has played the most promi-
nent role in the surrogate debate to date: baby selling. The question
involves the application of "black market baby" statutes, which most
states have, that forbid the payment of money to a woman who is
placing her child for adoption.
Kentucky law, for example, invalidates consent for adoption, or
the filing of a voluntary petition for termination of parental rights
prior to the fifth day after the birth of a child, and also prohibits
remuneration related to adoption. Since the remuneration provision
applies only to adoption (and not to termination of parental rights)
Kentucky surrogate agencies contend that they can pay surrogates
who simply relinquish their parental rights, the child thereafter going
to its father.82 However, attorney general Steven Beshear disagrees,
noting that the statutory intent in both instances is to give the mother
time to "think it over." He has written an opinion that surrogate con-
tracts are illegal and unenforceable in Kentucky and has filed suit
against Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., to enjoin them from
continuing their business in the state.83
The Michigan courts are the only ones to have ruled on the ques-
81. E.g.. KEANE, supra note 51 and Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a
Child. 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (1981-82).
82. See. e.g.. interview with Dr. Richard Levin of Louisville, Kentucky's Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc., AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, June 20, 1980 at 3, 13.
83. A.G. Op. 81-18 (Jan. 26, 1981) ("The Commonwealth of Kentucky does not condone
the purchase and sale of children"); Castillo, Kentucky Attorney General Calls Surrogate
Motherhood Illegal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1981 at C9. Accord, A.G. Op. 83-001 (Ohio, Jan.
3, 1983) (unlicensed person may not solicit surrogates or offer to pay them a fee). Contra
Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky Ex-
perience, 69 Ky. L.J. 877 (1980-81).
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tion directly. In a suit filed by Noel Keane to declare unconstitutional
those sections of the Michigan Adoption Code that prohibit the pay-
ment of surrogates in connection with adoptions, the court ruled that
the statutes were valid. It held that they did not prohibit the couple
from having a child but only from "paying consideration in conjunc-
tion with their use of the state's adoption procedures."'84 Reasonable
arguments can be advanced in favor of paying surrogates for ovum
donation and womb rental (or "uterine services"). 8" Nevertheless, we
do not believe it is in the public interest to encourage payment for
these services by changing the law because, even though services are
part of what is being purchased, what is really wanted, and for all
practical purposes what is principally being purchased is a child.
8 6
That is the only reason such contracts are entered into and the only
reason payment is made. That is why surrogate childbearing is seen
as an alternative to adoption. While economists may argue the
benefits of baby selling, 87 their arguments generally remind one of
the old definition of an economist: someone who knows the price of
everything and the value of nothing. We see no reason to forbid a
woman (a relative or friend) from deciding to bear a child for another
woman out of compassion or love; but payment for such a service
could encourage the view that children are commodities, and since
this would probably be harmful to children, payment should con-
tinue to be forbidden. Payment may also be harmful to the surrogate
herself and her physician. In guidelines on surrogate mothering
issued by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
physicians are called on not to "participate in any surrogate mother
programs where the financial arrangements are likely to exploit any
of the parties." The guidelines stress that the health of the mother
84. Doe v. Atty. General. 106 Mich. App. 169, 174 (1981) Discussed with disapproval in
Casenote, Surrogate Motherhood: The Outer Limits of Protected Conduct. 4 DET. C.L. REV.
1131 (1981). The case affirmed Doe v. Kelley. 6 F.L.R. 3011 (1980) in which the court had
said: "Mercenary considerations used to create a parent-child relationship and its impact
upon the family unit strike at the very foundation of human society and is potently and
necessarily injurious to the community."
85. Dickens, The Ectogenetic Human Being: A Problem Child of Our Time. 18 U.W.
ONT. L. REV. 241, 258 (1979-1980).
86. Cf. Annas, Contracts to Bear a Child: Compassion or Commercialism. 11 (2)
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 23 (April 1981).
87. Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage. 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
Cf. Podolski. Abolishing Baby Buying Limiting Independent Adoption Placement. 9 FAM.
L.Q. 547 (1975) and see WALZER. supra. note 70.
222 Family Law Quarterly. Volume XVII. Number 2. Summer 1983
must be the physician's main concern and the surrogate herself the
source of any consent required in management of the pregnancy. 88
IVF with a surrogate involves at least one other major issue: who is
the mother? We believe that the current legal assumption should re-
main, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding; i.e., the womb
mother should continue to be considered the natural mother of the
child. This not only provides for certainty of identification at the time
of birth (a protection for both the mother and the child), but also
recognizes the biological fact that the womb mother has contributed
more of herself than the genetic mother to the child and therefore has
a greater interest in it. This fact has led some commentators, like
Issac Asimov, to suggest that IVF surrogacy is not likely to be very
popular. In his words:
A baby is not, after all, a matter of genes only. A great deal of its development
in the fetal stage depends upon the maternal environment; upon the diet of the
host-mother, the efficiency of her placenta, the biochemical details of her cells
and bloodstream. The biological mother may not feel that the baby she
receives from someone else's womb is truly hers, and when flaws and short-
comings (real or imagined) show up in the infant, the biological mother may
not patiently and lovingly endure them, but may blame them on the host
mother.19
Whether or not Asimov's prediction is correct, we believe that at
present the evidence suggests that surrogate mother agreements are
not in the best interests of either the child or society, and should be
discouraged by both physicians and lawyers. Although we do not
recommend legislation to prohibit surrogacy, or any other form of
human sexual reproduction (since we all believe that governmental
involvement in reproduction should be as minimal as possible), all
legislative and regulatory proposals should be strictly examined to in-
sure that their primary thrust is to protect the unrepresented third
party involved: the would-be child.
88. ACOG News Release, May 10. 1983, "Guidelines on Surrogate Mothering"; and see
RCOG Guidelines supra, note 39, in which RCOG's ethics committee reports that it con-
siders "it unethical to implant embryos conceived by lVF into surrogate mothers "and gives
the following reasons for its conclusions: (1) the surrogate mother might change her mind
and decide to deep the child; (2) the agreement is not legally enforceable; and (3) commer-
cial exploitation of women volunteers might "easily follow."
89. ASIMOV supra note 8 at 352.
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Summary
IVF and ET are remarkable medical achievements that promise off-
spring to couples for whom bearing children was previously impossi-
ble. But these medical procedures raise serious social issues regard-
ing indications, selection, consent, donor oocytes, donor embryos,
and surrogate childbearers. Caution and prudence are demanded.
Professional standards regarding research in IVF are laudable and
should continue to be developed. Public discussion should be en-
couraged. Donor embryos and surrogate childbearing for IVF
should, at least at this time, be discouraged. Too many potential
problems exist for too little potential benefit. Model legislation seems
premature at this time, although it certainly is time to sharpen the
issues and determine what steps we can take to protect both the
would-be children and society itself from the negative potentials of
IVF and ET.
In Orwell's 1984 "The Ministry of Peace concerns itself with War,
the Ministry of Truth with lies, the Ministry of Love with torture, and
the Ministry of Plenty with starvation."9" It is similar "doublethink"
to believe that "anything goes" if the goal is to produce a child for an
adult that wants one. As Aldous Huxley wrote more than twenty-five
years after he imagined Brave New World:
Brave New World presents a fanciful and somewhat ribald picture of a society
in which the attempt to recreate human beings in the likeness of termites has
been pushed almost to the limits of the possible. That we are being propelled
in the direction of Brave New World is obvious. But no less obvious is the fact
that we can, if we so desire, refuse to cooperate with the blind forces that are
propelling us.91
90. ORWELL, supra note 5 at 178.
91. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED at 24-25 (1958).

